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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences of some structural re-
forms on the institutional coherence of OECD countries, particularly Continen-
tal Europe, and on their economic performance, particularly employment.Because
institutions in developed political economies are interrelated through a complex
network of complementarities, institutional change has consequences beyond
the area concerned by a reform. This also implies that there are complemen-
tarity e¤ects in reforms themselves. A challenge of reform programs is therefore
to achieve a new type of complementarities between reformed institutions. The
paper presents empirical evidence questioning the compatibility of the ongoing
structural reforms in product and labour markets with the existing institutional
structures in some OECD countries. The coherence of the exicurity strategy,
i.e. a combination of labour market exibility and generous welfare state, is
also questioned, both from economic e¢ ciency and political economy points of
view.
Keywords: structural reforms, models of capitalism, exicurity
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1 Introduction
The received wisdom about the current situation of Continental Europe is that struc-
tural reforms are needed to boost economic performance, especially with respect to
employment and growth. According to a commonly-found diagnosis (e.g. Sapir,
2004), European institutions would be at odds with the requirements of contempo-
rary capitalism. They may once have been adapted to the post World War II catch-up
period but allegedly have become a hindrance in a context of globalisation and more
intense innovation-based competition. The new techno-economic paradigm would
make it impossible for an economic model that lacks exibility and adaptability to be
competitive. It would therefore be impossible to maintain the institutional framework
adapted to a growth trajectory based on a stable economic environment: too rigid
labour markets, excessivelyregulated product markets, restrained nancial markets,
etc. In order to adapt European economies to the new times, a considerable e¤ort
should be made in terms of structural reforms (OECD, 2005).
Since unemployment is at the centre of the economic debate, labour market in-
stitutions have been considered the key area for reforms (Siebert, 1997). Employ-
ment protection is held to prevent several categories of the population from accessing
employment: women, low-skilled, young or senior workers. It would protect un-
fairly those already employed the insidersto the detriment of those excluded from
the labour market the outsiders. Taxation, redistribution mechanisms and labour
unionsinuence would lead to salary scale limitations. This would have the twin ef-
fect of making the least productive workers unemployable while being a disincentive
to the most qualied ones, those whose investment in human capital should be at
the root of the knowledge-based growth trajectory. The insu¢ cient exibility of the
labour market would hinder the structural change that is necessary to a transition
to an innovation-based economy (Saint-Paul, 2000). It would weaken companies and
discourage them from hiring, and thus from producing.
The implementation of labour market exibilisation measures has met two types
of di¢ culty. First, the empirical evidence in favour of positive employment e¤ects of
labour market deregulation has been less than fully convincing (Baker et al., 2005;
Freeman, 2005). Second, reformse¤ects may involve a J-curve aspect, i.e. benets
would appear at best in the long run but short term e¤ects would be negative. This
aspect would involve political economy problems for reforms. For these and second-
best theory-related reasons, the argument has shifted in favour of the implementation
of joint reforms, i.e. in several institutional areas instead of one (Braga de Macedo and
Oliveira-Martins, 2006). The existence of complementarities across institutions would
imply a complementarity in policy reforms. Partial reform would be detrimental
to the global economic performance whereas joint reforms would permit to exploit
complementarities.
Product markets are supposed to have strong complementarities with labour mar-
ket reforms (Nickell, 1999), but more generally, taking into account that "a liberal
2
reform package has to be comprehensive by nature" (Braga de Macedo and Oliveira-
Martins, 2006, p.4), many other institutional areas are concerned: nancial systems,
education systems, macroeconomic policy... To a large extent, this view has become
dominant in European policy-making circles. The so-called Lisbon strategy epito-
mises this e¤ort to transform the socio-economic model of Europe in order to make it
"the most competitive knowledge-based economy". Given the long list of areas where
structural reforms should be implemented, it appears that this is not a mere dusting
of the characteristic institutions of the model but a radical change.
The di¢ culties in achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda are related to the
di¢ culties of transforming the European models of capitalism into a model mostly
based on the prominence of market mechanisms. Many comparative political econ-
omy contributions have analysed the diversity of capitalism in developed countries
and within Europe in particular (Amable, 2003). There is no single European variety
of capitalism but several distinct models characterised by specic institutions and, of
course, specic patterns of interdependence between these institutions. The di¤eren-
tiation of models within Europe should make the pursuit of a general liberal strategy
more di¢ cult. And even a coordinated liberal reform wave may a¤ect di¤erently the
coherence of the concerned economies.
A recent literature has focused on the positive consequences that joint deregu-
lation policies could have for employment, particularly labour and product markets
(Nickell, 1999). Another literature has argued that the combination of labour market
exibility and welfare state-based security could be a solution to Continental Europes
employment problems (OECD, 2006). All these solutions are based on the alleged
positive e¤ects of liberalisation policies. The aim of this paper is to make a tentative
assessment of the impact of some liberal reforms on the economic performance of af-
fected countries, and in particular with respect to the employment e¤ects. The paper
is organised as follows. The following section presents the diversity of models of cap-
italism in Europe and the OECD. Section 3 gives an overview of the consequences of
structural reforms for the coherence of the European model(s) of capitalism. Section
4 assesses the likely complementarity of some structural reforms and their e¤ects on
employment performance. Section 5 gives a critical look at the exicurity strategy.
A last section proposes a brief conclusion.
2 Diversity of capitalism and European models
The main idea behind every theory of the diversity of capitalism is that di¤erent
socioeconomic models are neither near-identical versions of fundamentally the same
market economynor random collections of economic institutions. Furthermore, it
would be wrong to assume that in order to achieve the best economic performance,
it would su¢ ce to take the bestinstitutional forms in every area (labour markets,
nancial systems, education and training. . . ) and combine them. The concept of
institutional complementarity was rst formulated by Aoki [1994], following an idea
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found in Milgrom and Roberts [1992] about organisational complementarity within
a rm. From an institutional complementarity point of view, combining the suppos-
edly most e¢ cient institutions would not produce the optimal institutional design for
growth and welfare, but merely be impossible. Institutionsinuence on the economy
should not be considered independently from one another; they exert a joint inu-
ence on agentsstrategies and therefore on the economy. Institutions a¤ecting one
area of the economy (e.g. the labour market) will have consequences beyond that
particular area. In the case of wage bargaining, for instance, the outcome depends
on each partys outside options. These outside options are in turn dependent on the
institutions a¤ecting other areas than the labour market. It can be the alternative
job for the worker, which may depend on its skill level and hence on the institutions
concerning the education and training system; the alternative option for the rm may
depend on its relocation possibilities, i.e. on the regulatory environment, the liquid-
ity of the nancial market. . . What is to be considered is therefore how institutional
forms in di¤erent areas complement each other. The existence of institutional com-
plementarities explains how di¤erentiated varieties of capitalism may exist, based on
di¤erent complementarities between institutional forms.
In a seminal contribution, Michel Albert (1991) distinguished two types of socioe-
conomic models: the so-called Rhinemodel of capitalism and the neo-American
model. The former characterises of course Germany, but also other European and
even non-European countries such as Japan, and is characterised by long-term com-
mitments, collective achievements and consensus. The neo-American model repre-
sents mostly Anglophone economies such as the US and, within Europe, the UK, and
is dened by an emphasis on individual achievement, the importance of short-term
nancial benets, or reversibility and exibility of commitment. Albert (1991) con-
siders that the Rhine model is superiorto the neo-American model and better suited
to European societies. Nevertheless, free competition among varieties of capitalism
should not be expected to favour the emergence of superior forms of organisation and
eliminate inferior ones. The emergence and stability of a specic model depend on
political action.
The opposition between a German-type and an Anglophone model of capitalism
has become a classic feature of the comparative political economy of capitalism, par-
ticularly in Hall and Soskice (2001). In their rm-basedapproach, Hall and Soskice
consider several spheres in which rms develop relationships to resolve coordination
problems central to their core competencies: industrial relations, vocational train-
ing and education, corporate governance, interrm relations and the coordination
problems rms have with their own employees, i.e. internalcoordination. Di¤er-
ent institutional environments will lead rms to develop di¤erentiated patterns of
coordination and rmscompetitiveness will depend on the quality of these coordi-
nation modes. Instead of one optimalinstitutional model, the VoC approach pro-
poses two models, the coordinated market economies (CMEs) and the liberal market
economies (LMEs), with each having its own comparative institutional advantage.
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Therefore, whereas mainstream economics approach would predict that globalisa-
tion, by strengthening the competitive pressure on rms, would lead to convergence
towards the unique optimal model of capitalism, the VoC approach contends that
because of their respective comparative institutional advantage, CMEs and LMEs
will respond di¤erently to globalisation. A process of bifurcated convergence is ex-
pected: countries roughly classied as CMEs should become even more coordinated
while the competitive market coordination should become more compelling in LMEs.
Globalisation should therefore intensify the existing di¤erences between CMEs and
LMEs.
Hall and Soskices binary classication of economies between LMEs and CMEs
leaves a certain number of national cases occupying ambiguous positions since they
do not clearly rest on market-based coordination principles nor possess strong and
organised interest groups upon which non market coordination could be based. France
and Italy are examples of such intermediate countries. Not being clearly identied
as belonging to any puretype, they are lumped along a few other Latincountries
in the ad-hoc category of Mixed Market Economies(MMEs). MMEs are expected
to degenerate since they are conceived as less e¢ cient than pure types such as LMEs
and CMEs.
A typology of the di¤erent types of capitalism, based on a binary opposition be-
tween LMEs and CMEs is much too narrow for analysing the existing diversity of cap-
italism. Amable (2003) has proposed a theoretical and empirical analysis of the diver-
sity of capitalism, which leads to the distinction of not two, but ve types: neo-liberal
or market-based capitalism, continental European capitalism, social-democratic cap-
italism, "Mediterranean" capitalism, and Asian capitalism. The institutions of these
types of capitalism di¤er in the areas of product market competition, labour market
and labour relations, social security, education systems, and nancial systems. The
institutional complementarities associated with these particular kinds of institutions
are also specic; they dene distinctive types of capitalism.
Product market competition is an important element of the market-based model.
Intense product market competition makes rms more sensitive to adverse demand or
supply shocks. When price adjustments cannot fully absorb shocks, quantity adjust-
ments matter, particularly concerning the labour force. Therefore, product market
competition leads to a de facto exibility of employment. Competitive market pres-
sure demands that rms react quickly to changing market conditions and modify
their business strategies. This is made possible by quickly reacting nancial markets,
which favour a fast restructuring, itself facilitated by exible labour markets. This
economic model favours fast adjustment and structural change and therefore entails
a high degree of risk for specic investments. Risk-diversication for nancial invest-
ments is guaranteed by sophisticated nancial markets, but specic investments are
particularly at risk in this model since social protection is underdeveloped. There-
fore there is little incentive to invest in specic skills since these skills would not
be protected either by the welfare state or by job security and a rapid structural
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change would devalue them. Competition extends to the education system. A non
homogenised secondary education system makes competition among universities for
attracting the best students and among students for entering the best universities
more crucial.
The social democratic model is organised according to very di¤erent complemen-
tarities. A strong external competitive pressure requires some exibility of the labour
force. But exibility is not simply achieved through layo¤s and market adjustments;
retraining of a highly-skilled workforce plays a crucial role in the adaptability of
workers. Protection of specic investments of employees is realised through a mix of
moderate employment protection, a high level of social protection, and an easy access
to retraining thanks to active labour market policies. A coordinated wage bargaining
system enables a solidaristic wage setting which favours innovation and productivity.
A centralised nancial system enables rms to develop long-term strategies.
The Continental European model possesses some features in common with the
social democratic model. The latter combines a high degree of social protection with
a moderate employment protection, the former is based on a higher degree of em-
ployment protection and a less developed welfare state. Here again, a centralised
nancial system facilitates long-term strategies and does not compel rms to respect
short term prot constraints. Wage bargaining is coordinated and a solidaristic wage
policy is developed, but not to the same extent as in the social democratic model. Re-
training of the work force is not possible to the same extent as in the social democratic
model, which limits the possibilities for an o¤ensiveexibility of the workforce and
fast restructuring of industries. Productivity gains are obtained by labour-shedding
strategies elaborated in complementarity with social protection, as with the early-
retirement policy.
The South European or Mediterranean model of capitalism is based on more em-
ployment protection and less social protection than the Continental European model.
Employment protection is made possible by a relatively low level of product market
competition and the absence of short term prot constraints due to the centralisa-
tion of the nancial system. However, a workforce with limited skills and education
level does not allow for the implementation of a high wages and high skills industrial
strategy. Increased product market competition may pressure for an increase in the
exibility of the labour market, for instance by a marked dualism of the workforce.
Employees of large rm would still benet from job security while young workers or
employees of small rms would have more exible labour contracts.
The Asian model of capitalism hinges upon the business strategies of the large
corporations in collaboration with the state and a centralised nancial system, which
enables the development of long term strategies. Workersspecic investments are
protected by a de facto rather than de jure protection of employment and possibilities
of retraining within the corporation. Lack of social protection and sophisticated
nancial markets make risk diversication di¢ cult and render the stability provided
by the large corporation crucial to the solidity of the model.
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The above models being ideal-types, no single developed economy is accurately
described by any of the ve models of capitalism. Countries possess characteristics
which make them close to one or the other model, without being fully identiable
with the model itself. For instance, a strict market-based economy organised follow-
ing the institutional complementarities of the neoliberal model will probably never
exist. It is nevertheless useful to keep the reference of these ideal-types in order to
understand the institutional mechanisms upon which the coherence of the various de-
veloped economies is based. Moreover, the models of capitalism allow to go beyond
the apparent dissimilarities between two economies and to identify their common
structural traits.
3 Structural reforms and the coherence of institu-
tions
Most models have experienced institutional transformations in the last decade, par-
ticularly the European models (Amable, 2003, ch. 6). From an institutional com-
plementarity point of view, institutional reforms question the coherence of the whole
model, and local institutional change most probably implies some transformation of
institutions in other areas. If macroeconomic performance depends on the degree of
institutional coherence (Hall and Gingerich, 2004), structural reforms are bound to
deteriorate the situation in terms of unemployment or growth before possibly leading
to an improvement. The existence of a J-curve e¤ect is indeed a classic argument in
the political economy of structural reforms.
Reforms recommended by the OECD,1 the European Commission or by various
expert reports (e.g. the Sapir report) aim at transforming quite substantially the
labour markets and social protection systems of the Continental, Mediterranean and
even social-democratic models of capitalism. One may for instance take the rec-
ommendations made in the 2008 issue of the OECD publication "Economic Policy
Reforms: Going for growth". Employment protection legislation (EPL) should have
its costs diminished, presumably by diminishing the level of protection itself, in the
following countries: the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Japan (for regular employ-
ment), Portugal, Spain (for permanent workers) and Sweden. This list of countries
concerns economies that one could associate with four distinct models of capital-
ism. Furthermore, social protection should be reformed, meaning that it should
become less generous in Denmark (disability benet schemes), Finland (Unemploy-
ment benets), Hungary (disability), the Netherlands (disability), Norway (sickness
and disability, pensions), Spain (pensions), Sweden (sickness and disability benets),
the United Kingdom (disability-related benet recipients), and the US (health care
costs, disability benets). Following these recommendations would make the Conti-
1It must be noted that di¤erent divisions within the OECD make di¤erent recommendations in
terms of structural reforms.
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nental, Mediterranean and social-democratic varieties of capitalism resembling more
the market-based variety, with exible labour markets and a less generous welfare
state. The urge to go further in the direction of the market-based variety of capitalism
is also found in the recommendations concerning product markets. The general ad-
vice is to increase competition in product markets, and particularly in service sectors,
network industries and agriculture, in most countries. This general recommendation
would have of course more important consequences for countries whose production
model depends more on regulated industries than market-based economies.
More generally, there is a certain coherence in structural reforms since they, for the
most part, go in the market-based direction, but the implementation of such reforms in
non-market based economies implies a loss of coherence in these economies. Reforms
in a few institutional areas cannot lead to functionally coherent system because of the
interdependence between institutions and their consequences on agentsstrategies.
For instance, nancial deregulation has threatened the stability of the bank-
industry relationship, a crucial element of the Rhine modelof capitalism (Krahnen
and Schmidt, 2004), or more generally for the Continental European socioeconomic
model. Firms had the possibility, with the help of what has sometimes been called
patient capital, to devise and implement long-term industrial strategies, free from
the short-term pressure of nancial markets. Within the rm, agents have the possi-
bility to invest in specic assets and the rm may o¤er its employees a certain degree
of employment stability. The questioning of this patient nancing and governance
pattern and the emergence of a more short-termist nancing relationship, focussing
on liquidity, should threaten these arrangements and push the rm toward new types
of investment, to industrial restructuring, and should diminish the possibility to o¤er
a stable employment relationship.
Increasing product market competition could also favour labour market exibil-
isation. Such a complementarity is now widely acknowledged. Increasing product
market competition is expected to shift out the labour demand curve and raise the
benets brought by labour market deregulation, making the latter more politically
acceptable and more economically viable. This is why both recommendations for
deregulation are presented as complementary. This complementarity is held to inu-
ence positively the level of employment, which is not certain if the increase in product
market competition makes rmslabour demand more sensitive to the business cy-
cle, thereby raising employment insecurity for workers, and if labour markets possess
characteristics that make workers lower their work e¤ort when job insecurity is in-
creased and the real wage stays constant. Maintaining a competitive level of e¤ort
will thus imply a raise in real wages which will ceteris paribus lower labour demand
(Amable and Gatti, 2004). In this perspective, the complementarity issue is di¤erent
from the most common argument (Amable and Gatti, 2006). More varied comple-
mentarities are possible, not just an all-out market deregulation. One may envisage
an increase in product market competition being complementary (from the point of
view of employment) with an increase in employment protection. The latter would
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o¤set the wage increase e¤ect of the former and permit employment growth.
Other complementarities could also be troublesome. Increased job insecurity fol-
lowing the decrease in employment protection legislation (EPL) could raise the de-
mand for social protection. The combination of a decrease in job security following
the increase in product market competition and a dismantling of legal employment
protection is likely to increase the level of social insecurity. This should provoke an
increase in the demand for social protection at the time when current reforms are
mostly welfare state retrenchment. This is a clear inconsistency in reformedEuro-
pean models, an inconsistency which could only be eliminated by going further down
the liberalisation road. In a market-based system, it would be up to individuals to
turn to private insurance schemes. The development of insurance activities would be
facilitated by the development of market-based nance.
The Lisbon agenda also goes in the direction of a market-based transformation
of the European socioeconomic models. The set of 24 guidelines adopted by the
Council in 2005 are the main instruments for giving a new impetus to the Lisbon
agenda. This package gathers both the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGS)
and the Employment guidelines. It denes a more or less constraining framework for
all EU governments, which are supposed to elaborate National Action Plans aiming
at fullling the requirements of the Lisbon Agenda.
Guideline No.1 insists on the elimination of excessive decitsand the necessity
of structural reforms. A way to curb excessive decitsmay very well be to cut down
two important elements of the European model: public expenditure (such as social
expenditure) and public investment in infrastructure, particularly in a context of tax
competition. Guideline No.2. deals with Government debt reduction. The aim is
to reduce public spending and the public expenditure share. According to Guideline
No.3, redirection of public expenditure should be done, presumably away from un-
productivesocial expenditures. Guideline No.6 deals with coordination of economic
and budgetary policies: press forward with structural reforms that will increase
euro area long-term potential growth and will improve its productivity, competitive-
ness and economic adjustment to asymmetric shocks, paying particular attention to
employment policies. This means strong reduction in employment protection and
product market deregulation, i.e. a move towards the market-based model.
Competition is expected to deliver the proper framework for the pursuit of the
Lisbon objective. Several Guidelines (e.g. No.12 & No.13) insist on liberalisation of
product and service markets and a diminishing of the Public sector and more generally
on the promotion of external openness. Market openness may act as a (credible)
threat against trade unions; increased possibilities of relocation or outsourcing will
lead unions to accept cutbacks in employment protection levels, wages or working
conditions and undermine collective bargaining and interest representation. This is
a potential threat for redistributive policies through the wage-setting process.
A exicurity objective is mentioned in Guideline No.21: Promote exibility
combined with employment security. The latter should not be understood as employ-
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ment protection but as the possibility for red workers to nd another job, which
refers to the creation of liquidlabour markets, with no barriers between outsiders
and insiders.
One may sum up the expected complementarities (and lack thereof) associated
with ongoing structural reforms as in Table 1. Without being too functionalist, the
impression is that such a large set of inconsistenciesis bound to a¤ect macroeconomic
performance, without mention of the political economy aspects.
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4 Complementarity of policies and employment
Testing for the general institutional coherence of institutions following the recent wave
of structural reforms and their consequences on economic performance would be well
beyond the objectives of this paper. This section will have a look at one particular
complementarity in policies and reforms: that between labour market exibilisation
and product market competition. According to the orthodox view, the persistence
of high level of unemployment in continental Europe can be explained by the in-
stitutional arrangements at works in those countries. The underlying idea is that
the strength of institutional imperfections in European labour markets hinders the
proper functioning of these markets, making them inexible. Besides, imperfections
of competition in product markets would make labour market imperfections all the
more detrimental to employment (Nickell, 1999). The policy recommendations would
therefore be to remove obstacles to exibility in labour markets: decrease unemploy-
ment benets, weaken job protection legislation, increase mobility of labour, and to
improve product market competition (IMF, 2003; OECD, 1997).
Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2007) test whether a joint policy of product market
deregulation and decrease in employment protection has positive e¤ects on employ-
ment in an analysis the institutional and macroeconomic determinants of employment
for 18 OECD countries over the 1980-2004 period. Labour market performance is gen-
erally evaluated on the basis of unemployment rate or to a lesser extent on the basis
of employment rate. Instead, Amable, Demmou and Gatti consider three alternative
measures of employment: the joblessness rate, i.e. the part of the working age popu-
lation without a job, and its two components: the inactivity and unemployment rates.
The choice of a broader range of indicators is based on the following idea: statistical
denitions produce a sharp divide between the unemployed and the economically in-
active; in reality one should consider all those without work as being on a spectrum.
At one end, one nds people dened as unemployed (i.e. those currently engaged in
active job search) and, at the other end, one would have those who do not intend
ever to look for a job (Gregg and Wadsworth [1998]). By analysing labour market
performances through di¤erent situations of non-employment, Amable, Demmou and
Gatti (2007) aim to check for substitution e¤ects across these situations.
The model tested uses a specication common to many studies, e.g. Nickell et
al. (2005). It tests a panel data specication with a lagged dependent variable and
a series of macroeconomic and institutional regressors, in particular the institutional
features of the labour market: employment protection legislation (EPL), unemploy-
ment benet replacement rate, union density, tax wedge, and wage coordination.
Concerning non labour market imperfections, the OECD index of global product
market regulation (PMR),2 the intensity of nancialisation,3 as well an indicator of
2The use of other OECD indicators does not substantially alter the results.
3The ratio of assets of institutional investors to GDP.
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central bank dependence are considered. The set of macroeconomic control variables
is taken into account includes the role of credit constraints, competitiveness (real
exchange rate and structural trade balance), and average labour productivity. The
possible interdependency between regulation policies in labour and products market
is analysed: is there a substitutability or a complementarity e¤ect between prod-
uct markets deregulation and labour market exibilisation? In order to account for
these e¤ects, an interaction term between employment protection (EPL) and prod-
uct market regulation (PMR) is included in the regressions. Regressions include time
and country dummies. Several estimators are used, including Plümper and Troeger
(2007)s FEVD procedure for time-invariant variables in a model including xed ef-
fects.
A few results of Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2007) regarding joblessness are pre-
sented in Table 2. Some variables have the expected e¤ect according to the orthodox
view, such as union density, which increases joblessness, or credit to the economy,
which decreases it. Other results are at odds with the markets deregulation argu-
ment. In particular, one nds that nancialisation and central bank independence
are negatively correlated with employment. The impact of nancial assets highlights
a negative e¤ects possibly working through stronger macroeconomic volatility, indus-
trial restructuring and layo¤s.
Marginal e¤ects of product and labour markets regulation can be computed for
di¤erent levels of the other interacted variable, i.e. EPL for PMR and vice versa. The
marginal e¤ect of PMR is positive and signicant for all values of EPL, indicating that
increased product market competition would increase all components of employment.
The coe¢ cient measuring the marginal e¤ect of EPL is always negative and signi-
cant when PMR is set below or equal to the mean. Hence, employment protection is
actually good for employment, at average or low levels of product market regulation.
This nding questions both the orthodox view about the e¤ect of employment pro-
tection and the complementarity of product market deregulation and labour market
exibilisation policies. The marginal e¤ect of PMR is always stronger, the higher
EPL. Hence, product market deregulation is most e¤ective when EPL is kept at a
highest possible level. Concerning the marginal e¤ect of EPL, the positive impact of
employment protection is larger, the lower PMR. These results taken together point
to a substitution e¤ect across the two forms of (de)regulation: increasing employ-
ment protection amplies the positive e¤ect of product market deregulation. The
computation of the magnitude of the e¤ects conrm the substitution view. Whereas
a policy of joint deregulation would have little or no impact on joblessness for most
countries of the sample (Italy and, to a lesser extent, France being exceptions), a
policy of increased employment protection coupled with decreased product market
regulation would signicantly decrease joblessness in all countries.
The same tests are also performed for the two components of joblessness: in-
activity and unemployment. Results show that both react to institutional factors.
Coe¢ cients for the unemployment benet replacement rate and nancialisation are
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signicant for inactivity but not for unemployment. On the other hand, the tax
wedge appears to have a more important impact on the unemployment rate than on
inactivity. Concerning results on policy interdependence, Table 2 conrms that the
policy substitution scenario applies to the inactive population. However, the same
conclusion does not fully apply to unemployment. In particular, the marginal e¤ects
indicate that EPL does not signicantly a¤ects unemployment, except perhaps for
mean values of product market regulation. More signicantly, some degree of comple-
mentarity between deregulation policies seems to exist. Product market deregulation
now signicantly reduces unemployment for low to moderately high values of EPL.
Table 2. Summary of the results.
Joblessness Unemployment Inactivity
Employment protection   ! NS  =NS   ! NS
Product market regulation + + +
interdependency EPL/PMR substitution complementarity? substitution
coordination  =NS   +
Central Bank dependence      
Unemployment benets NS NS NS=+
Union density + + +
Tax wedge NS=+ + +
nancialisation + NS +
Terms of trade      
credit      
Trend of trade balance NS NS NS
  ! NS means that the marginal e¤ect of EPL is signicantly negative at low values
of PMR and becomes non signicant as PMR is raised.
Results summarised in Table 2 question the common faith in the positive e¤ects
of liberal structural reforms. If increased product market competition decreases job-
lessness in all its components, it should rather be associated with an increase in
employment protection rather than more exibilityin the employment relationship.
E¤ects such as those present in Amable and Gatti (2004) and (2006) may therefore
be present. Employment protection could be an incentive to greater e¤ort and exert
a wage-moderating e¤ect. Other structural reforms may not produce the expected
e¤ects either. Increased nancialisation is associated with increased inactivity for
instance. Also, a disorganisationof collective bargaining through a weakening of
trade unions would not necessarily have the positive employment e¤ects considered
by the orthodox view. If union density increases all components of joblessness, coor-
dination of employment relations decreases unemployment. An individualisation of
wage bargaining would not necessarily be benecial to employment.
The same model is also tested for di¤erent age groups. Only results concerning the
interaction between EPL and PMR are summed up in Table 3. Without surprise, the
results found for prime age workers are very similar to those found for total working
15
age population. Results tend to show a higher sensitivity to market imperfectionsfor
young and old workers (male). However, the signs of the coe¢ cients are at odds with
the standard deregulation view. For instance, EPL has a negative to insignicant
e¤ect on the unemployment and joblessness of men aged 15 to 24 and 55 to 65. The
result of policy substitution is broadly conrmed for most age groups. On the whole,
employment protection decreases or has no e¤ect on employment except at very high
levels of product market regulation. Product market regulation generally deteriorates
employment, except for some age groups at very low levels of employment protection.
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5 Is Flexicurity the answer?
The results presented in the preceding section lead to conclude that deregulation of
both product and labour markets may not be the ultimate solution for improved
employment performance. This nding would question both the liberal structural
reforms policy and the exicuritystrategy (Wilthagen, 1998; Madsen, 2002), which
is sometimes presented as the solution to the problems of the European model (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2007). It would preserve the social cohesion characteristic of
Europes models of capitalism while still enjoying the exibility and adaptability of
market-based models. There are of course several dimensions to labour market exi-
bility (Boyer, 1988), but the recent debate has for the most part focused on numerical
exibility of employment, i.e. the possibility for rms to re (and hire) with greater
ease, i.e. diminishing the level of EPL. Labour market exibilitys social consequences
would be mitigated by a generous and activewelfare state. The detrimental e¤ects
of employment insecurity, even in terms of an increased wage premium compensating
job insecurity (Amable and Gatti, 2006), would be avoided since employment security
could be provided by society, not by the rm. This corresponds to the idea that the
individual rather than the job should be protected (OECD, 2006).
There is an alluring aspect to this idea, but two elements may lead one to be
more cautious. First, the employment e¤ects of labour market exibilisation may
not be as expected, as illustrated above. A decrease in the level of employment
protection may even lead to a worsening of the employment performance, even if
some population groups may see their situation improve. If exibilitybrings little
or no benet in terms of labour market participation or employment, there is no point
in associating exibility with security. Second, even if one believes that labour market
exibilisation will bring improvements, if not in employment levels maybe in other
dimensions, political economy considerations may prevent the emergence or stability
of such an institutional arrangement (Amable and Gatti, 2007).
5.1 The employment e¤ect of exicurity
The impact of a exicurity strategy on employment may be assessed by using the same
type of estimations as the ones in Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2007) mentioned
in the previous section. The focus will this time be on the interaction between
the generosity of the unemployment benet scheme, measured by the net benet
replacement rate (RRi;t) and employment protection (EPL).
yi;t = i +   yi;t 1 +  RRi;t +   EPLi;t +  RRi;t  EPLi;t +   xi;t + i;t (1)
yi;t, xi;t correspond respectively to the annual observation of the dependent variable
and the vector of independent variables (for country i at year t). Regressions include
time and country dummies.
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According the exicurity view, the employment performance should improve with
a combination of generous employment benets and weak employment protection
legislation. Therefore, EPL should be all the more detrimental to employment that
the level of unemployment benets is low and the latter should increase joblessness
more when EPL is higher. Table 4 gives the results of the estimation for joblessness,
with the marginal e¤ects of employment protection legislation and unemployment
benets. As can be seen from the values of the marginal e¤ects, an increase in
unemployment benets raises the magnitude of the e¤ect of EPL, but not in the
expected direction. In fact EPL would decrease joblessness all the more that the
generosity of unemployment benets is high. Therefore, a decrease in joblessness
would be obtained by combining generous unemployment benets and a high level
of EPL. Likewise, an increase in EPL would gradually neutralise the detrimental
e¤ects of unemployment benets, as can be seen from the marginal e¤ects of these
benets. To sum up, there is no evidence of the type of interdependence between
unemployment benets and employment protection on which the exicurity strategy
is based on. Estimations for unemployment and inactivity give the same type of
results (see Appendix).
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lagged dep. Var. 0.797*** 0.776***
(0.033) (0.038)
Empl. protect. -0.084 -0.023
(0.906) (0.949)
Unemp. benef. x empl. prot. -2.565** -2.027*
(1.193) (1.222)
Unemp. Benef. 4.081** 4.052*
(1.960) (2.074)
union density 0.072*** 0.052**
(0.023) (0.025)
tax wedge 0.019 0.018
(0.022) (0.029)
financialisation 0.012***
(0.004)
real exchange rate -1.911** -2.718**
(0.935) (1.128)
lag productivity -0.589 -0.657
(1.994) (2.489)
credit to economy -0.071*** -0.075***
(0.011) (0.011)
trend trade balance -0.088* 0.062
(0.045) (0.093)
product market regulation 4.104*** 5.478***
(0.110) (0.130)
coordination -0.402*** -1.450***
(0.093) (0.106)
central bank dependance -0.625*** -0.828***
(0.071) (0.074)
year dummies Yes Yes
Number of Obs 266 227
Unemp. Benef.
min -0.345 -0.342
(0.805) (0.804)
mean less 1 sd -1.374*** -1.100*
(0.511) (0.579)
mean -1.733*** -1.359**
(0.484) (0.570)
mean plus 1 sd -2.092*** -1.618***
(0.513) (0.603)
max -2.419*** -1.869***
(0.581) (0.669)
Empl. prot.
min 3.824** 3.850*
(1.856) (1.981)
mean less 1 sd 2.717* 2.927*
(1.435) (1.611)
mean 1.338 1.844
(1.039) (1.352)
mean plus 1 sd -0.042 0.761
(0.959) (1.382)
max -1.148 0.037
(1.178) (1.563)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Joblessness
marginal effect of employment protection legislation
marginal effect of unemployment benefits (repl. rate)
Table 4. The interaction of
unemployment benets and EPL and
the impact on joblessness.
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Other results are more favourable to some aspects of the exicurity strategy. In-
teracting the share of active labour market policies expenditure in GDP with the
unemployment benet replacement rate allows to assess a possible complementar-
ity between welfare state generosity and activation policies. Table 5 reports the
marginal e¤ects of the two variables with estimations similar to the ones presented
above. Active labour market policies are increasing joblessness except when unem-
ployment benets are very generous. The e¤ects on inactivity and unemployment
are contrasted. On the other hand, the interaction of unemployment benets with
active labour market policy expenditure are unambiguous. The former have no em-
ployment decreasing e¤ects when the latter is very large. Therefore, active labour
market programs and generous unemployment benets could be combined without
having negative e¤ects on employment.
unemp. ben. joblessness inactivity unemployment
min 2.375*** 0.451 1.846***
(0.789) (0.531) (0.653)
mean less 1 sd 1.748*** 0.456 1.342***
(0.494) (0.302) (0.42)
mean 1.415*** 0.459** 1.075***
(0.389) (0.213) (0.321)
mean plus 1 sd 1.082*** 0.462** 0.807***
(0.366) (0.198) (0.268)
max 0.7 0.466 0.499*
(0.456) (0.287) (0.295)
act. lab. pol. joblessness inactivity unemployment
min 7.366*** 3.308** 4.151***
(2.196) (1.351) (1.576)
mean less 1 sd 6.496*** 3.315*** 3.451**
(1.875) (1.138) (1.397)
mean 4.680*** 3.331*** 1.992
(1.565) (0.955) (1.325)
mean plus 1 sd 2.865 3.347** 0.532
(1.906) (1.293) (1.671)
max -1.433 3.387 -2.923
(-3.923) (2.914) (-3.19)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
marginal effect of unemployment benefits
marginal effect of active labour market policies
Table 5 Marginal e¤ects of active labour market
policies and unemployment benets.
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5.2 Flexicurity and political economy
There may exist political economy obstacles to the implementation of a strategy asso-
ciating labour market exibilisation with an increase in the generosity of the welfare
state. Labour market exibilisation may set o¤ a dynamics of political weakening of
labours collective representation, thus decreasing labours bargaining power in the
design of public policies. Such an evolution would probably not favour the emer-
gence of a political equilibrium favourable to the extension of social protection, i.e.
the counterpart to increased labour market exibility in the exicurityscheme. Be-
sides, the general movement of liberal structural reforms may a¤ect the institutional
complementarities favourable to a generous welfare state, reinforcing a dynamics of
institutional change in the direction of a mere exibilitymodel instead of exicurity
Table 6 presents the results of simple regressions of an indicator of generosity
of the welfare state on a certain number of institutional variables, using the same
panel of countries as in the previous section. The dependent variable is the index of
generosity designed by Allan and Scruggs [2005]. This indicator is built with the help
of net benet replacement rates for unemployment, retirement and unemployment
as well as indicators on the extent of protection and entitlement conditions. This
index is regressed on various other institutionsindices, for employment protection,
product market regulation end nancialisation. A variable representing the partisan
position of the government is included; this variable is all the more negative that the
governing parties are left-wing, and all the more positive that governing parties are
right wing.4
One can see from Table 6 that, as expected, left-wing coalitions are associated
with more generous welfare states. Besides, the generosity of the welfare state is pos-
itively correlated with employment protection, most certainly because the political
and social inuences on these variables are very similar. Agents demanding social
protection are likely to demand employment protection as well in a search for so-
cial security in general. The possibility for the emergence of a trade-o¤ between a
generous welfare state and employment protection is therefore not guaranteed. Be-
sides, other types of institutional change do not seem to be favourable to the welfare
state either. As documented In Table 6, nancialisation is negatively correlated with
the welfare states generosity. The correlation with product market regulation seems
to be somewhat looser but a signicant positive correlation between regulation and
welfare state is sometimes found.
4The partisan position of the government is constructed on the basis of the 2002 version of the
PGL File Collection by Thomas R. Cusack and Lutz Engelhardt of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
für Sozialforschung. Their dataset provides variables for numerous political parties reecting the
relative frequency of statements in party manifestos on characteristic economic and non-economic
political topics. It is possible to construct a continuous variable expressing the position of a party
on a left-right axis. The position of the government is the weighted average of the positions of
governing coalition parties (Amable, Gatti and Schumacher, 2006).
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index of generosity of the welfare state
lagged variable 0.697*** 0.728*** 0.728***
(0.043) (0.047) (0.04)
EPL 1.313*** 0.903* 1.352***
(0.258) (0.477) (0.466)
partisan position -0.006* -0.004 -0.006**
(-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003)
inactivity rate -0.070**
(-0.027)
financialisation -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.012***
(-0.002) (-0.004) (-0.003)
PMR -0.183 1.821*** -0.1
(-0.225) (0.668) (-0.095)
eta 1.000***
(0.152)
Number of Obs 272 267 272
FEVD PCSE PCSE
Country dummies yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6. Institutions and the generosity of the welfare
state.
6 Conclusion
Because institutions in developed political economies are interrelated through a com-
plex network of complementarities, institutional change has consequences beyond the
area concerned by a reform. This also implies that there are complementarity e¤ects
in reforms themselves. A challenge of reform programs is therefore to achieve a new
type of complementarities between reformed institutions. The general orientation of
structural reforms has been a move toward liberalisation and deregulation of markets.
A complementarity between deregulated product markets and exibilised labour mar-
kets is supposed to lead to an improvement in the employment performance. However,
empirical tests do not support the existence of such a complementarity. This does not
imply the general non existence of liberalised market-based complementarities, but
could be the consequence of the diversity of capitalism within OECD countries. The
implementation of some market-based structural reforms, even in conjunction with
one another, may not be enough to transform political economies based on di¤erent
principles into liberal market economies.
Another reform strategy attempts to combine exibility in labour markets with
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security through social protection. Empirical tests performed in this article lead to
question the economic e¢ ciency of such an arrangement. Active labour market pro-
grams rather than diminished employment protection would seem to be the crucial
element to combine with a generous welfare state in the search for labour market
e¢ ciency. Other tests raise the question of the political conditions for the stability of
a exicurity strategy. Generous welfare states have been possible in countries where
the organised labour movement has been strong enough. Welfare state institutions
are therefore generally associated with institutions that protect workers, such as em-
ployment protection legislation. While not ruling out the possibility for a future
emergence of a political trade-o¤ between employment protection and social security,
the results presented above emphasize the sociopolitical compromise upon which the
institutional architecture of the modern economies are built.
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b/se b/se
lagged dep. Var. 0.671*** 0.655***
(0.063) (0.054)
Empl. protect. -0.054 0.194
(0.924) (0.656)
Unemp. benef. x empl. prot. -1.285 -0.932*
(1.055) (0.546)
Unemp. Benef. 2.545* 1.882*
(1.539) (1.009)
union density 0.037** 0.050***
(0.016) (0.015)
tax wedge 0.039* 0.053***
(0.022) (0.019)
financialisation 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.005)
real exchange rate -1.339 -1.466**
(0.853) (0.591)
lag productivity -1.243 -1.128
(1.436) (1.860)
credit to economy -0.040*** -0.049***
(0.009) (0.007)
trend trade balance 0.065 0.069
(0.068) (0.067)
product market regulation 2.236*** 2.265***
(0.141) (0.140)
coordination -1.302*** -1.700***
(0.080) (0.061)
central bank dependance -0.305*** -0.378***
(0.042) (0.057)
education 0.004
(0.026)
year dummies Yes Yes
Number of Obs 227 178
Unemp. Benef.
min -0.256 0.047
(0.783) (0.631)
mean less 1 sd -0.736 -0.285
(0.516) (0.616)
mean -0.900* -0.411
(0.467) (0.627)
mean plus 1 sd -1.065** -0.536
(0.455) (0.645)
max -1.224** -0.655
(0.481) (0.670)
Empl. prot. b/se b/se
min 2.416 1.788*
(1.472) (0.962)
mean less 1 sd 1.831 1.403*
(1.236) (0.777)
mean 1.145 0.907
(1.169) (0.584)
mean plus 1 sd 0.458 0.411
(1.357) (0.497)
max -0.001 0.035
(1.586) (0.538)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Unemployment
marginal effect of employment protection legislation
marginal effect of unemployment benefits (repl. rate)
Table A1. The e¤ect of exicurity on unemployment.
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lagged dep. Var. 0.895*** 0.863***
(0.024) (0.046)
Empl. protect. -0.355 -0.324
(0.512) (0.628)
Unemp. benef. x empl. prot. -0.780 -0.836
(0.734) (0.688)
Unemp. Benef. 2.345* 0.870
(1.226) (1.095)
union density 0.034** 0.003
(0.015) (0.016)
tax wedge 0.014 0.040**
(0.014) (0.017)
financialisation 0.004* 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003)
real exchange rate -1.649*** -1.186***
(0.543) (0.423)
lag productivity -0.939 -7.469***
(1.096) (2.156)
credit to economy -0.034*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.008)
trend trade balance -0.085* -0.050
(0.049) (0.070)
product market regulation 2.770*** 3.068***
(0.066) (0.079)
coordination -0.497*** -0.246***
(0.063) (0.093)
central bank dependance -0.376*** -0.032
(0.060) (0.066)
education -0.074***
(0.021)
year dummies Yes Yes
Number of Obs 247 196
Unemp. Benef.
min -0.478 -0.455
(0.449) (0.552)
mean less 1 sd -0.766* -0.753*
(0.407) (0.434)
mean -0.868** -0.867**
(0.433) (0.419)
mean plus 1 sd -0.969** -0.981**
(0.478) (0.424)
max -1.065** -1.085**
(0.533) (0.447)
Empl. prot.
min 2.267* 0.786
(1.160) (1.036)
mean less 1 sd 1.914** 0.435
(0.877) (0.805)
mean 1.495** -0.011
(0.609) (0.590)
mean plus 1 sd 1.075** -0.458
(0.533) (0.564)
max 0.769 -0.821
(0.647) (0.701)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Inactivity
marginal effect of employment protection legislation
marginal effect of unemployment benefits (repl. rate)
Table A2. The e¤ect of exicurity on inactivity.
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